Parliamentary Groups in the Evolving Italian Political System by Cozzoli, Vito
Duquesne Law Review 
Volume 52 
Number 1 Comparative Law in an Era of 
Globalization 
Article 9 
2014 
Parliamentary Groups in the Evolving Italian Political System 
Vito Cozzoli 
Follow this and additional works at: https://dsc.duq.edu/dlr 
 Part of the Comparative and Foreign Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Vito Cozzoli, Parliamentary Groups in the Evolving Italian Political System, 52 Duq. L. Rev. 177 (2014). 
Available at: https://dsc.duq.edu/dlr/vol52/iss1/9 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Duquesne Scholarship Collection. It has been accepted 
for inclusion in Duquesne Law Review by an authorized editor of Duquesne Scholarship Collection. 
Parliamentary Groups in the Evolving Italian
Political System
Vito Cozzoli*
I. INTRODUCTION: WHY ARE PARLIAMENTARY GROUPS
IMPORTANT IN A COMPARATIVE PROSPECTIVE? ........... 177
II. PARLIAMENTARY GROUPS AGAINST THE BACKDROP OF
CHANGES IN THE ITALIAN SYSTEM ................. 178
III. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND TO THE ESTABLISHMENT
OF PARLIAMENTARY GROUPS ...................... 183
IV. FORMATION OF PARLIAMENTARY GROUPS ...... ..... 185
V. THE SO-CALLED "MIXED GROUP"............. ..... 189
VI. THE FUNCTIONS OF PARLIAMENTARY GROUPS:
INDIVIDUAL MEMBER PRIVILEGES AND
PREROGATIVES .................................. 192
VII. THE PHENOMENON OF PARLIAMENTARY "MOBILITY".. 199
VIII. COMPARATIVE REMARKS: THE U.S. HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES AND SENATE .................... 203
IX. CONCLUSIONS .............................. ..... 207
I. INTRODUCTION: WHY ARE PARLIAMENTARY GROUPS IMPORTANT
IN A COMPARATIVE PROSPECTIVE?
The nature, work and legislative trends in parliaments across
the world are subject to research, analysis, and debate amongst
scholars and practitioners.' This explains why a study on parlia-
* General Counsel at the Italian Parliament, Chamber of Deputies. With special
gratitude for Dante Figueroa, Marco Cerase, and Edward Cervini.
1. For example, a study congress was held in Boston in November 2008 entitled The
Most Disparaged Branch: Congress. The Role of Congress in the 21st Century. Symposium,
The Most Disparaged Branch: Congress. The Role of Congress in the 21st Century. 89 B.U.
L. REv 335 (2009). Moreover, in 2010 two former officials of perhaps the oldest national
Parliamentary institutions in the world-Westminster and the U.S. Congress-published a
comprehensive work on parliamentary proceedings and precedent that was presented in
many locations around Europe and North America. Many more essays can be found in
recent publications about this subject matter. Id.; W. MCKAY & C.W. JOHNSON,
PARLIAMENT AND CONGRESS: REPRESENTATION AND SCRUTINY IN THE 21ST CENTURY, (Ox-
ford University Press, 2010). Before this book, the classical comparison between the UK
and the U.S. was that which is quoted above. K. BRADSHAW & D. PRING, PARLIAMENT AND
CONGRESS, (Quartet Books, London, 1973).
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mentary groups (hereinafter also "parliamentary fractions") could
be a contribution in this landscape.
Parliamentary fractions arise from the elected members of a
given party in a nation's parliament or governing body. A fraction
is not simply an association of elected members united by a com-
mon goal,2 and its presence suggests more than the coincidental
election of men and women who think alike. Parliamentary
groups result from the organization of political parties within leg-
islative bodies and reflect the will of the electorate.'
The study of parliamentary fractions provides a vehicle for de-
bate over the role of parliaments, the way they function, and what
relevance they maintain in a world where the public decision-
making process sharply diverges from the one that existed for
most modern nations' constitutional framers two, or even three,
centuries ago.
This essay is intended to offer analysis on the significant proce-
dural roles the parliamentary fractions play in both Houses of
Parlamento Italiano, the Italian Parliament. This essay also
wishes to offer some comparative remarks and to provide the Eng-
lish-speaking reader with adequate insight into the similarities
and differences between the multi-party Italian framework and
the two-party system prevailing in the United States Congress.'
II. PARLIAMENTARY GROUPS AGAINST THE BACKDROP OF
CHANGES IN THE ITALIAN SYSTEM
The examination of parliamentary groups provides a particular-
ly important vantage point for understanding the dynamics of in-
stitutional change and the transformations that have occurred in
the Italian political system.' It is precisely the parliamentary
2. The Floor of The House approved a change in its Rules-on 25 Sept, 2012-that
gives this definition and provides for checks on fractions' budget. See It. Chamber of Depu-
ties R. 14(01). "Parliamentary Groups are associations of Deputies established pursuant to
the provisions set forth in this Rule. Inasmuch as Parliamentary Groups are entities nec-
essary for the functioning of the Chamber of Deputies, pursuant to the Constitution and
Rules of Procedure, they shall receive funds from the Chamber of Deputies budget to carry
out their activities." Id.
3. BRADSHAW & PRING, PARLIAMENT AND CONGRESS, supra note 1, at 14; see also R.H.
DAVIDSON & W. J. OLESZEK, CONGRESS AND ITS MEMBERS 163 (CQ Press, Washington
2000).
4. BRADSHAw & PRING, PARLIAMENT AND CONGRESS, supra note 1, at 10-14.
5. See V. Cozzoli & F. Castaldi, I gruppi parlamentari della Camera dei deputati tra
rappresentanza democratica e funzionalith politico parlamentare, IL FILANGIERI 339, 350
(2007); IL PARLAMENTO NELLA TRANSIZIONE, XIII (S. Traversa & A. Casu, eds. Giuffre 1970)
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groups that constitute the crucial linkage between the government
and parliament on the one hand, and coalitions and political par-
ties on the other. Parliamentary groups influenced some of the
most significant developments in the transitional period in which
the Italian institutional system has been enduring-the crisis of
the traditional political parties, the difficulty of new political play-
ers to become established, the evolution of electoral law-and thus
have had inevitable repercussions on the organization and func-
tioning of Parliament. These developments represent major,
symptomatic changes in the institutional process while, at the
same time, sending out contradictory signals of instability typical
of the Italian situation in recent years.' Indeed, the evolution at
the Chamber of Deputies (hereinafter also the "Parliament
House") seems to have surpassed the 1971 reform's approach in
"the real need for the Chamber to be organized by Groups and for
the Groups, in favor of the emergence of a new operational rule
based on the dialectic between majority and opposition.'
As stated earlier, this paper will try to examine the different
role given to the parliamentary groups under the new bipolar con-
ception of relations between the political forces within the Houses
of Parliament in the wake of the largely "first past the post" elec-
toral system introduced in 1993 (which was, however, transformed
again in a proportional representation system in 2005) and follow-
ing the reforms of the Rules of Procedure of the Parliament House
introduced in 1997-1999.9 More than ten years later, the im-
portance of these changes-which have also affected the role of
(regarding the transition and instability, which has been affecting Italy's politico-
institutional framework for many years).
6. V. COZZOLI, I gruppi parlamentari nella transizione del sistema politico isti-
tuzionale, Le riforme regolamentari alla Camera dei deputati nella XIII legislatura, 14
(2002).
7. See Report of the Rules Committee on the 1971 Reform of the Rules of Procedure of
the Chamber, Il nuovo regolamento della Camera dei deputati illustrato con i lavori prepar-
atori, Camera dei deputati, 10 (1971).
8. See M. Manetti, Riforme istituzionali: qualche riflessione sul metodo, in
GIURISPRUDENZA COSTITUZIONALE, 413, n.1 (1998).
9. Laws no. 276 and 277 of 1994 introduced for both Houses of Parliament a hybrid
electoral procedure replacing the former proportional system, under which three quarters
of the Members of the Chamber of Deputies and three quarters of the Senators were elected
with a single-ballot first-past-the post system in single-member constituencies. The remain-
ing seats were allocated under a proportional criterion: seats at the Chamber were appor-
tioned, in the twenty-six constituencies, among those competing lists, which had overcome
the four percent threshold on a national basis; at the Senate, seats were divided among
groups of candidates in proportion to the votes obtained in individual regional districts by
non-elected candidates.
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parliamentary groups-is also emphasized by the fact that the
Rules of Procedure very often anticipate the changes in the politi-
co-institutional system because of their direct linkage with the
Italian Constitution.
With the enhanced emphasis on stability in government, and
the development of the Italian political system in the direction of a
"first past the post" system,o there has been a stronger legitimiza-
tion of parliamentary majority and opposition "poles," which enjoy
significant parliamentary privileges and prerogatives." Indeed,
the parliamentary Rules of Procedure explicitly refer to majority
and opposition groups as "poles."1 2
This innovative approach to the parliamentary dynamics-a re-
jection of the pact-building approach that characterized the 1971
Rules of Procedure 3 and the so-called "blocked" democracy mod-
ell 4-strengthens the role of the government and its parliamen-
tary majority, without weakening the role of the opposition. How-
ever, this method does not yet seem to be typical of the overall ap-
proach adopted by the current Rules of Procedure. The current
rules do not provide for parliamentary groups to be structured
along the lines of the two-way division of majority versus opposi-
tion, partly because the political system has not yet acquired a
fully bipolar character. Indeed, the political forces making up the
various electoral coalitions have failed after their election to set up
a parliamentary group as a single political coalition representing
them all. Once again they have split and divided, preserving their
separate political identities and their share of the popular vote."
10. See Manetti, supra note 8, at 413, n.1.
11. Through programming of parliamentary business and going beyond the principle of
unanimity, while imposing strict constraints on the distribution of parliamentary time,
such as to ensure a predictable timeframe, both to the majority and the opposition, for the
consideration of measures; voting on selected representative amendments or by principles,
for the sake of procedural economy; time limits for the consideration of bills by Committees;
oversight and fact-finding procedures vis-A-vis the Government; Prime Minister Question
Time and urgent interpellations.
12. See It. Chamber of Deputies R. of P. R. 16-bis (1), 24(3).
13. MAZZONI HONORATI M.L., II procedimento legislativo, in LABRIOLA S. II parlamento
repubblicano (1948-1998), Quaderni della Rassegna parlamentare, 271, n.3 (Guiffre
ed. 1999).
14. According to the formula conventio ad excludendum, post-war Italy was a blocked
democracy, in which government transformation was virtually impossible due to the pres-
ence of the Communist Party in the political system. See ELIA L., Forme di governo, XIX
ENCICLOPEDIA DEL DIRITTO 658 (1970).
15. Regarding the former aspect, the number of Parliamentary Groups that have been
established paradoxically exceeds that of previous parliaments using the pure proportional
system: in the Fourteenth Parliament the Chamber of Deputies had eight groups (nine in
the Senate) and at the end of the Thirteenth Parliament there were nine groups; in the
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The Rules of Procedure of the Chamber seem to have taken ac-
count of this complex and contradictory situation" by introducing
a series of measures to encourage a polarization of parliamentary
dynamics, giving specific prerogatives to the majority and the op-
position groups." They have also sanctioned the growing frag-
mentation of the Chamber by adopting new provisions for the
Mixed Group." These provisions" acknowledge the various com-
ponent parts or groupings of the Mixed Group as each having an
autonomous political and parliamentary personality: mini-groups,
as it were, within the Group.20 These phenomena are related to
Twelfth Parliament there were as few as eight, which then rose to eleven, while the Elev-
enth Parliament had seven de jure groups, to which a further six authorized groups were
subsequently added. Apart from this, the political situation in the Thirteenth Parliament
was even more fragmented because of the formal acknowledgement in the Rules of Proce-
dure of the Chamber of Deputies of the political entities or groupings established within the
Mixed Group (in the Fourteenth Parliament there were nine of these groups). Recently, in
the Fifteenth Parliament that ended early in 2006, Italian history had never seen such a
number of Parliamentary groups: fourteen Parliamentary groups and four political entities
of groupings established within the Mixed Group. But in 2010, during the Sixteenth Par-
liament, there are a smaller number of Parliamentary groups: six Parliamentary groups
and six political entities or groupings established within the Mixed Group.
16. Regarding the need for a radical rationalization of the legislative process in a dete-
riorated context, see A. PALANZA & F. POSTERARO, Tendenze recenti nella formazione delle
leggi: una nota introduttiva, BOLLEWTINO DI INFORMAZIONI COSTITUZIONALI E
PARLAMENTARI, Camera dei deputati, 43-44, n. 1-3 (1995).
17. Concerning the amendments to the Rules introduced in 1997 and 1999, see SoI A.,
Le modifiche al regolamento della Camera dei deputati, ITER LEGIS., 35 (2007); N. Lupo, Le
recenti modifiche del regolamento della Camera: una riforma del procedimento legislativo "a
Costituzione invariata," GAzZETTA GIURIDICA GlUFFRt 2, n.37 (1997); S. CECCANTI, Rego-
lamenti parlamentari: un altro tassello di una "riforma strisciante", QUADERNI
COSTITUZIONALI 157, n.1 (1998); A. CELLATO & MENCARELLI, Prime considerazioni sul
nuovo art. 96-bis del Regolamento della Camera, RASSEGNA PARLAMENTARE 653, n.3
(1998); A. MORRONE, Quale modello di Governo nella riforma del Regolamento della Cam-
era dei deputati?, QUADERNI COSTITUZIONALI 449, n.3 (1.998); C. DI ANDREA, Sulle ultime
modificazioni del Regolamento della Camera dei deputati, in RASSEGNA PARLAMENTARE 99,
n.1(1999); MAZZONI, supra note 13, at 269, n.3; G. RIVOSECCHI, Sulle recenti modifiche del
regolamento della Camera dei deputati, in GAZZEIr'A GIURIDICA GIUFFRE, 6, n.18 (1999); L.
STROPPIANIA, La riforma dei regolamenti parlamentari: un processo non ancora con-
cluso?,QUADERNI COSTITUZIONALI 101, n.1 (2000); G. ROLLA, Riforma dei regolamenti par-
lamentari ed evoluzione della forma di Governo in Italia, RIVISTA TRIMESTRALE DI DIRITI'O
PUBBLICO 593, n.3 (2000); R. BIN, La disciplina dei gruppi parlamentari, IL PARLAMENTO,
CONVEGNO ANNUALE DELL'ASSOCIAZIONE ITALIANA COSTITUZIONALISTI, 12-14 (2000); M.
MAZZIOrI DI CELSO, Le funzioni parlamentari, IL PARLAMENTO, CONVEGNO ANNUALE
DELL'ASSOCIAZIONE ITALIANA COSTITUZIONALISTI 111-115 (2000); M.L. MAZZONI HONORATI,
Considerazioni critiche sul rapporto tra regolamenti parlamentari e forma di governo, in Il
Parlamento, Convegno annuale dell'Associazione Italiana Costituzionalisti, 343-352 (2000).
18. The Mixed Group brings together Deputies who have failed to declare their mem-
bership of a parliamentary group and those who opt for joining it.
19. Further political sub-grouping may be established within the Mixed Group. See It.
Chamber of Deputies R. of P. R. 14(4-5).
20. See F. LANCHESTER, Presentation at the Seminar on the revision of the Constitu-
tion at LUISS University (March 20, 1998) on La riforma del regolamento della Camera dei
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the weakness of the party system in the current transition and to
the impact of the new electoral legislation that tends towards a
majoritarian system.21 The present stage in the institutional de-
velopment of Parliament therefore seems to involve a reappraisal
of the role and function of parliamentarians in the various forms
of democratic representation,2 2 both through the parliamentary
groups and as individual Members of Parliament (hereinafter
"MPs").
More specifically, because of the unifying function performed by
the groups with regard to their members and by being the expres-
sion of the political parties, the Groups are the necessary bench-
mark for the structure and the operation of each House of Parlia-
ment. Today, more than ever before, the Groups are being re-
quired to draw up the political strategies of the parties as well as
the coalitions to which they belong, fostering homogenization and
political coordination.
However, individual parliamentarians have increasingly de-
manded greater visibility and scope in political and parliamentary
decision-making processes. The majoritarian electoral law is en-
hancing their role and their position and very significantly is giv-
ing them a more immediate and direct relationship with their con-
stituents. This will have to be re-assessed when the new propor-
tional legislation with a majoritarian correction enacted in 2005 is
brought into effect.23
Against this background, the protection of the opposition and
individual members is the natural way of balancing the "first past
the post" system, thereby avoiding the risks of excessively simpli-
fying the polarized political dynamics. 24 This new parliamentary
deputati, in I costituzionalisti e le riforme. Una discussione sul progetto della Commissione
bicamerale per le riforme costituzionali, 246 (S.P. Panunzio ed.1998).
21. See VERZICHELLI L., I gruppi parlamentari dopo il 1994. Fluiditd e riaggregazioni,
RIISTA ITALIANA DI SCIENZA POLITICA 410, n. 2 (1996).
22. Through political parties.
23. Legge Dicembre 2005 n.270 (It.) introduced a fully proportional system for election
to the Chamber of Deputies, with the possibility of the award of bonus seats for a nation-
wide majority result, replacing the earlier partly proportional system. The new rules pro-
vide that with regard to the candidates, the political parties submitting lists may also form
coalitions; parties intending to stand for election to the position of ruling party must also
submit their manifesto and announce the name of their leader. The voting procedure per-
mits voters to cast only one vote on their preferred list, with no preference votes. The seats
are distributed proportionately nationwide between the coalitions of lists and the lists that
have exceeded the statutory minimum thresholds.
24. An organization of parliamentary business totally based on the majoritarian princi-
ple does favor a stable government and a transparent interaction between majority and
Vol. 52182
Parliamentary Groups
system is based on the idea of establishing a new identity for Par-
liament as the forum for political debate and decision-making,2 5
according to the rationale of "decision-making democracy,"2 6 thus
moving away from the "blocked democracy" model. 27 The parlia-
mentary process is thus intended to arrive at decisions by political
debate between the majority groups and the opposition groups.2 8
In short, between 1997 and 1999, the Rules of Procedure in both
the Italian Houses were changed in order to adjust parliamentary
proceedings to a new political scenario based on the debate be-
tween the majority and the minority parties that entailed a more
competitive approach to politics and legislation. Since the general
election of 1994 there has always been-except in recent times,
with a broad coalition supporting a technical cabinet related to
economic emergency-a majority party and an opposition party.
Therefore, the specific rules regarding parliamentary groups had
to be changed.
III. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF
PARLIAMENTARY GROUPS
The creation of parliamentary groups, as permanent organiza-
tions of senators or deputies belonging to the same party or at
least taking their inspiration from the same political ideology,
within the parliamentary assemblies, is not exclusive to the mod-
ern status of political parties because the tendency to group to-
gether in terms of political kinship is something that is common to
all political bodies.29
opposition, but, on the other hand, it may limit political pluralism and constrain the pre-
rogatives of smaller groups and individual MPs.
25. It is also based on improving the quality of legislation. See, e.g., ZAMPETTI U.,
Tecniche legislative e procedure parlamentari, 1 RASSEGNA PARLAMENTARE, 163 (1998).
26. Decision making democracy involves using the right equilibrium between decision
and debate. See HON. LuCIANO VIOLANTE, Forward to the Volume collecting the Preparato-
ry proceedings on Modificazioni al Regolamento della Camera dei deputati approvate
dall'Assemblea nel, at XI (1998) (foreword by the President of the Chamber in the 13th
Parliament, Hon. Luciano Violante, to the volume collecting the preparatory proceedings on
Modificazioni al Regolamento della Camera dei deputati approvate dall'Assemblea nel
1997).
27. See ELIA L., Forme di governo, XIX ENCICLOPEDIA DEL DIRITTO, 658 (1970).
28. Compare CERASE M. Opposizione politica e regolamenti parlamentari, 133, 216
(2005)
29. For more on the functions and legal status of parliamentary groups, see G.
SAVIGNANGO, Igruppi parlamentari, Napoli 209 (1965); G.U. RESCIGNO, Gruppi parlamen-
tari, ENCICLOPEDIA DEL DIRITIO 779 (1970); D. MARRA, La riforma del regolamento della
Camera QUADERNI COSTITUZIONALI 559-563 (1983); P. RIDOLA, Divieto di mandato impera-
tivo e pluralismo politico, SCRITTI IN ONORE DI CRISAFULLI, II, Padova (1985); C. GATTi, I
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Historically, the formation of parliamentary parties preceded
the formation of the popular parties that, initially, were merely
the projection of the divisions existing within the Parliament.
However, the question of recognizing and regulating the political
groups only arose with the extension of universal franchise and
the adoption of the proportional electoral system, with a majori-
tarian correction replacing the previous "first past the post" sys-
tem.
In Italy, it was the 1919 Electoral Act" that introduced the new
electoral system of competing lists with proportional representa-
tion. The Parliamentary Groups entered the Chamber after the
1920 procedural reform."' It was the internal response that ad-
justed the regulations to the new Italian constitutional system
that followed the 1919 elections. The liberal state of government
by the nobles became a state based on broad democratic participa-
tion. The entry of political parties changed both the scenarios and
the personalities in politics, and the parliamentary rules reflected
the change and institutionalised the new political dynamics.
While the Chamber under the "Statuto Albertino"3 2 made no ref-
erence to party membership, the 1920 Chamber of Deputies de-
ferred to a party-based system in which the groups in the Cham-
ber were the mandatory organizational structure for the elected
representatives. The rules at that time were very similar to the
gruppi parlamentari nella Germania Occidentale, 106 (1986); G. NEGRIG & L. CIAURRO,
Gruppi parlamentari, in ENCICLOPEDIA GIURIDICA 1-9 (1989); T. MARTINEST, C. DE CARO, V.
LIPPOLIS & MORE'r' Diritto parlamentare, RIMINI 94-110 (1992); CARDARELI, La disciplina
dei gruppi parlamentari tra rappresentanza politica, finanziamento dei partiti e funzional-
it& delle Camere, DIRITO E SOCIETA 711-19 (1993). Regarding the constitutional status of
the parties and their "capacity to act as a nodal point of the relationship between democra-
cy and pluralism," compare P. RIDOLA, Diritti di libertd e costituzionalismo 1 (1997).
30. Leggee 16 Novembre n.1985 (It. 1918), Leggee 15 Aug. (It. 1919) introduced a re-
form of the electoral rules for the elections of 1919 and 1921. As compared with the 1912
electoral law, the franchise was extended to all male citizens 21 years of age or who had
performed military service. The proportional system-already used from 1882 to 1891-
was reintroduced in order to ensure that also minority lists that had gained a significant
share of the votes would be represented in Parliament.
31. The 1919 general elections, held soon after the introduction of the new list-based
proportional system, which led to the 25th Parliament of the Kingdom of Italy, were a ma-
jor turning point in parliamentary law and, more importantly, provided an political and
institutional answer to the coming to the fore of the popular masses and the development of
the new mass-based political parties. As a result, ten new Rules were introduced in par-
liamentary procedures to regulate Parliamentary Groups and Standing Committees. A
new system of parliamentary rules thus began to take shape that-to the exception of the
Fascist interruption-would shape until the Republican period the organization of the
Chamber of Deputies on the basis of Groups and Committees.
32. The Constitution of The Kingdom of Italy was adopted in 1848 and overruled in
1948, when Italy became a Republic with Constitution.
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present rules: (1) it was mandatory to register as a member of a
party; (2) there had to be a minimum of twenty Deputies; (3) as an
exception smaller groups could be authorized; (4) arrangements
were made for a Mixed Group; and (5) the Groups appointed their
representatives to parliamentary Committees.
The reasons underlying the 1920 reform of the Rules were set
out in the Constitution of the Republic that recognized political
parties (article 49) referring to Parliamentary Groups (articles 72
and 82) for the composition of the Committees sitting in an enact-
ing capacity, and Committees of Inquiry, which are required to
reflect the proportions of the Parliamentary Groups. These provi-
sions enshrined the principle of the organization of Parliament
based on Groups. With the 1971 reform, the Rules of Procedure
further specified and broadened many of the powers of the Groups
by recognizing that the Chambers were "organized by the Groups
and for the Groups" (as stated in the explanatory memorandum on
the changes made to the Rules of Procedure).33
IV. FORMATION OF PARLIAMENTARY GROUPS
The Constitution of the Republic refers to the Groups in two
places, albeit only indirectly: in article 72 and article 82. Howev-
er, there can be no doubt that the parliamentary Groups are not
only the natural and necessary projection of the parties in Parlia-
ment, but are also the load-bearing structure of parliamentary
organization. Membership of a group is mandatory on all parlia-
mentarians: the Rules of Procedure require34 Deputies to declare
to which Parliamentary Group they wish to belong within two
days of the first session of the House, and Senators within three
days. The minimum number required to set up a Parliamentary
Group in the Chamber of Deputies is twenty, while the minimum
number for senators is ten. But there are possible exceptions for
both Chambers.
The Bureau of both the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate
may authorize fewer parliamentarians to create a group than the
prescribed number, subject to certain conditions. The conditions
provided by both sets of rules for the creation of smaller groups
(dictated by Rule 14 of the Rules of Procedure of the Chamber and
the Senate), are:
33. See Report of the Committee on the Rules of Procedure, Il nuovo Regolamento della
Camera dei Deputati illustrato con I lavori preparatory, Chamber of Deputies 10 (1971).
34. See R. 14(3).
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a) to be the expression of a political movement that has some
recognition in the social and political texture of the Country;
and
b) to have put forward candidates in a minimum number of
constituencies, hence garnishing a minimum number of
votes. 5
These requirements, however, still refer to the old rules of pro-
portional representation. The Rules of Procedure have taken up
the provisions of the new electoral law in several places by intro-
ducing new procedures and concepts (in terms of scheduling par-
liamentary business, pre-legislative scrutiny and consultation,
and parliamentary oversight). However the statutes have not
completed the necessary adjustment of the rules governing the
composition of groups waiving the minimum required numerical
membership, which are still the ones that existed under the old
proportional representation electoral system (prior to the largely
"first past the post" system introduced in 1993). In addition, the
Parliamentary Rules of Procedure for the past twelve or so years
have not been consistent with the new largely "first past the post"
electoral legislation. With the adoption of the new proportional
representation legislation in 2005, the provisions of the Parlia-
mentary Rules of Procedure have become fully current again be-
cause they were drawn up precisely for the proportional represen-
tation system, even though some elements of the rules have not
been contemplated in the new electoral law.
In the Twelfth and Thirteenth Parliaments, these provisions re-
garding authorization to waive the minimum number of members
required to set up a Parliamentary Group were not applied, and
indeed were deemed not to be applicable, even by analogy, to the
new semi-first-past-the post electoral system; the Bureaus of both
the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate turned down the re-
quests that were made by various political groups for waivers.3 6
In the Fourteenth Parliament, there was a change in the case
law of the Chamber of Deputies.3 7 Article 14(2) of the Rules of
Procedure of the Chamber had since become inapplicable (which,
as already mentioned, referred to the previous proportional repre-
sentation electoral system) and was considered to have been su-
35. See R. 14(2).
36. COZZOLI, supra note 6, at 66.
37. See id. at 352.
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perseded by the Rules of Procedure Committee, which adopted a
new interpretation of the rule to adjust it to the new system. The
Committee ruled that, apart from the literal wording of that pro-
vision, it was designed to make it possible for representatives of
the political forces to set up a Parliamentary Group provided that
they were permanently organized in the country, had taken part
in the elections using their own lists of candidates, and had ob-
tained, nationwide, at least four percent of the valid votes cast 3 8'
The Rules Committee therefore gave permission for the small
Communist Party (Rifondazione Comunista) to form a Group,
which was subsequently authorized by the Bureau. At the same
time, the Bureau urged that Rule 14(2) governing this issue
should be amended to bring it into line with the legislation govern-
ing elections to the Chamber of Deputies. This interpretation was
accompanied by yet another guideline adopted by the Committee,
ruling out the possibility to invoke this interpretation in the pre-
sent Parliament for any further political groupings.
The Committee also took note of the fact that the elements
characterizing the position of Rifondazione Comunista could not
be claimed again in the same Fourteenth Parliament for other po-
litical groupings. This was a clear way of emphasizing that this
new interpretation of the Rules of Procedure of the Chamber could
only be used at the beginning of the Fourteenth Parliament to au-
thorize political forces that had individually exceeded the electoral
threshold, and therefore could not be used for groups that, for ex-
ample, had been created by splitting off from existing groups.39
The establishment of Groups under a waiver became very topi-
cal in 2006 at the beginning of the Fifteenth Parliament, following
a proportional representation-oriented reform adopted at the end
of the Fourteenth Parliament.4 0 The electoral system was then
changed back to a proportional representation mechanism with a
majoritarian correction in 2005; the elections of 2006 returned a
Parliament full of small parties that were not formally entitled to
be a fraction within the Assembly but demanded to be one none-
theless.
38. See Rules of Procedure Committee, session of June 13th 2001.
39. See, e.g., S. CURRERI., I gruppi parlamentari autorizzati nella XIV legislatura in
www.forumcostituzionale.it, 12 (2006); Igruppi parlamentari nella XV legislatura in Quad-
erni costituzionali, n.3 (2006).
40. See Legge Dicembre 2005, supra note 23, at n.270, on the new electoral system
voted in 2005.
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Indeed, the Bureau of the Chamber received requests in 2006 to
set up six parliamentary Groups with less than twenty members.
The Rules Committee was then asked at its meeting on May 16,
2006 to consider and provide an interpretation on the scope of the
application of Rule 14(2) in view of the new electoral legislation.
This provision had never been amended since its coming into force
in 1971, despite several changes to electoral legislation. Thus,
there was a need for a clarifying interpretation to ensure con-
sistency between the new law, on the one hand, and the require-
ment for political parties to be organized on a national basis, as
well as the electoral result on the other.
With respect to the requirement for political parties to be orga-
nized on a national basis, and in view of the need to ensure con-
sistency with the evolution of the political system and the electoral
law, the Rules Committee adopted the following stance on the oc-
casion of the above-mentioned meeting: "A Party organized on a
national basis" is deemed to mean a "political force" (also includ-
ing several parties) which, although not strictly corresponding to
the letter of the law, is unequivocally identifiable at the time of
elections because it has submitted electoral lists with the same
emblem, provided it was not established after the elections. Thus,
the electoral list was considered as the criterion to identify the
political force, which is recognized by the Rules as a relevant enti-
ty for the Parliament.
With respect to the electoral result required, the Rules Commit-
tee held that, in view of the changed electoral system, electoral
lists-which have been registered in at least twenty constituen-
cies-are required to obtain access to the allocation of seats on a
national basis. On the possibility of setting a minimum number of
members for the establishment of parliamentary Groups to be au-
thorized under Rule 14(2), the Rules Committee stated that a
strict interpretation of the Rules does not seem compatible with
an interpretation whereby the authorization to establish a Group
would require a minimum number of members. In the light of this
interpretation adopted by the Rules Committee on May 17, 2006,
the Bureau of the House held a lively and, at times, harsh debate,
which continued the next day on the Floor of the House. As a re-
sult, the Bureau authorized the establishment of four small
groups under Rule 14(2): a socialist-leaning group, a neo-
communist one, an environmentalist one and a Catholic one.
The Bureau did not authorize, however, a Group called 'Move-
ment for Autonomy,' as it had not fulfilled the electoral result re-
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quirement in compliance with the interpretation rendered by the
Rules Committee on the strength of the new electoral legislation.
The new parliamentary group, if authorized, would not have rep-
resented the entire political force identified by the list which had
participated in the elections, as the above-mentioned movement
had submitted joint lists with the Lega Nord."
Concerning the status of groups set up under a waiver, it should
be recalled that during the Fifteenth Parliament the principle of
equal status among the groups was formally established, with no
deminutio for groups set up under derogation. In 2008, however,
at the outset of the Sixteenth Parliament, no requests to authorize
the establishment of groups under a waiver (i.e., below the mini-
mum membership requirement) were submitted. In the Chamber
of Deputies, the Bureau's powers were strengthened such that the
Bureau could now dissolve a parliamentary group if falling below
the minimum number provided for under the Rules. This power is
consistent with the sole responsibility of the Bureau to authorize
the establishment of groups under a waiver (i.e. below the mini-
mum membership requirement).
V. THE SO-CALLED "MIXED GROUP"
Members who have not declared membership of any other group
constitute the "Mixed Group." In the Chamber of Deputies during
Thirteenth Parliament, it became particularly necessary to ensure
greater visibility and political autonomy for the minority political
forces present in each of the two electoral coalitions.
A problem therefore arose concerning the nature and the inter-
nal management of the Mixed Group, which had become unprece-
dentedly and abnormally large because it comprised, not only in-
dividual members of Parliament, but whole political movements
that had not wished or been able to find a different placing within
the electoral coalitions, and had preferred to remain independent.
Because of these situations, at the end of the Thirteenth Parlia-
ment the Mixed Group was comprised of ninety-two members in
the Chamber of Deputies (of whom seventy were members of in-
ternal political groupings and twenty were not), which was almost
five times larger than the original number (twenty-six deputies),
making it numerically the third largest group in the Chamber
41. See COZZOLI & CASTALDI, supra note 5, at 355. The Lega Nord is a party fighting
for independence of the North Eastern part of Italy.
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(approximately fifteen percent of the overall membership of the
Chamber of Deputies). In the Senate, the Mixed Group was com-
prised of forty-three senators or about fourteen percent of the total
membership. This was less marked in the Fourteenth Parliament,
where the Mixed Group was comprised of sixty-three Deputies and
thirty-four senators.
Additionally, during the Fifteenth and Sixteenth Parliaments,
the number of MPs who joined the Mixed Group decreased consid-
erably. This was clearly due to the much stronger linkage between
MPs and his/her party under in the new electoral legislation. In
the Fifteenth Parliament, Deputies belonging to the Mixed Group
amounted to thirty-three members, as against thirty-one Sena-
tors; in the Sixteenth Parliament, twenty-four Deputies and six-
teen Senators joined the Mixed Group.
This group is extremely varied, because it has lost its "last-
resort" character and has now become a "super-group" with widely
differing types of political forces permanently belonging to it. As a
result, its political thinking is very difficult to clearly identify.
The organizational and political problems that have made it diffi-
cult to govern the Mixed Group were addressed by the 1997 re-
form of the Rules, which was intended to regulate the conditions
for membership of the Mixed Group.42 Political groupings could be
established within the Group under the following conditions:4 3
* at least ten Deputies must submit the request (this is a
purely numeric requirement; this procedure for creating an
internal grouping within the Mixed Group is therefore de-
tached from any relationship to a particular party or political
movement);
42. See V. DI CIOLO & L. CIAURRO, Le recenti modifiche dei regolamenti parlamentari,
Appendice di aggiornamento (update), 31 March 1998, to the volume II diritto parlamentare
nella teoria e nella pratica, 36-37 (1998).
43. Deputies belonging to the Mixed Group may ask the President of the Chamber to
form political groupings within it, on the condition that each consists of at least ten Depu-
ties. Smaller groupings may also be formed, as long as they include not less than three
Deputies. These Deputies must represent a party or political movement the existence of
which can be demonstrated, on the date of the elections to the Chamber of Deputies, by
precise and unequivocal features, and which must, alone or jointly with others, have pre-
sented lists of candidates or individual candidates in the single-member constituencies. Not
less than three Deputies belonging to linguistic minorities protected by the Constitution
and referred to in an Act of Parliament may also form a single political grouping within the
Mixed Group. These Deputies must have been elected, in areas in which these minorities
are protected, from, or in connection with, lists that reflect these minorities. See Rule 14
(5).
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* a request made by at least three Deputies, but in this case
they would have to represent a party or political movement
that had stood for election to the Chamber of Deputies as such
(this second type of grouping has a political characterization,
even though the numerical condition still applies, and alt-
hough the number is smaller than in the first case);
* a request can be entered to set up a single political grouping
by at least three deputies who were elected to represent lin-
guistic minorities protected by the Constitution and recog-
nised by law (in this case three conditions must be met: (a) a
minimum of three deputies must apply; (b) they must be
members of a linguistic minority; and (c) they must have been
elected within lists representing a linguistic minority).
It was because of this "bloating"44 of the Mixed Group that it be-
came necessary to give prerogatives and rights to the political
groupings established therein to ensure that they are as broadly
involved in parliamentary work as possible by recognizing that
they possess their own legitimacy and political visibility, as well
as specific powers based on the Rules of Procedure. One only has
to think of the organization of the debates taking into account the
groupings and the times to be allotted to them, and their partici-
pation in the work of the Conference of Parliamentary Group
Chairpersons.
It should be noted, however, that the establishment of political
groupings within the Mixed Group is only provided for by the
Rules of Procedure of the Chamber of Deputies. There is no gen-
eral provision for this to occur in the Senate, but representatives
of the political groupings within the Mixed Group do have the
right to submit parliamentary "interpellations" using the short-
ened procedure, pursuant to article 156-bis, para. 1.
44. See N. LUPO, Le recenti modifiche del regolamento della Camera: una riforma del
procedimento legislativo "a Costituzione invariata", in Gazzetta Giuridica Giuffrk, 2, n. 37
(1997).
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VI. THE FUNCTIONS OF PARLIAMENTARY GROUPS: INDIVIDUAL
MEMBER PRIVILEGES AND PREROGATIVES
According to the parliamentary rules, the Groups have two
types of functions: (1) in relation to the organization of the two
Houses; and (2) in relation to individual members.45
First, with regard to the functional organization of the Cham-
bers, the Groups are the yardstick for the composition of the in-
ternal bodies, in order to guarantee their representative character
and (as far as possible) their proportionality. They are also the
instrument which makes it possible to guarantee the particular
"political economy," as is emphasized in the literature" of parlia-
mentary business. In this regard, the Group chairpersons enjoy a
number of procedural prerogatives which are often (in the Cham-
ber of Deputies, but not in the Senate) linked to the size of their
groups. These are known as weighted requests, where the Rules
of Procedure require that a particular procedural point be sup-
ported by a given quorum of deputies "or by one or more Group
Chairpersons which, separately or jointly, account for at least the
same number . . . ."47 Then, there are cases in which the proce-
dural power of the Group Chairpersons is recognized independent-
ly of any weighting of the numerical size of the group (which is
obviously favorable to groups with smaller numbers of members).
The groups have a number of powers and privileges within the
parliamentary system according to the Rules of Procedure of the
Chamber of Deputies.
With regard to the agenda setting, the Group Chairpersons
have deliberative voting powers at the Conference of the Group
Chairpersons for approving the agenda and the timetable of the
House; the representatives of the groups also attend the meetings
of the Committee Bureaus for the adoption of the program and
timetable. Each group is allocated time which is partly equal for
all the groups, and partly proportional to the size of the group
memberships. A Parliamentary Group may request that for the
phases following a general debate on an exceptionally important
bill, time quotas are established only following a unanimous deci-
sion of the Conference of Group Chairpersons, or when the debate
is unable to be concluded and the bill is set down for a later time-
45. See COZZOLI, supra note 6, at 28.
46. See MANZELIA, II Parlamento, 95 (1977).
47. Rule 114(1); see also Rules 44(1) and 114(2).
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table. For time-restricted debates, it is mostly permitted for one
deputy to speak for each group, in addition to the dissenting
members.
The relevant committee must initiate consideration of those
bills endorsed by a Parliamentary Group within one month. The
Chairperson of a Parliamentary Group may request the Bill to be
declared urgent; the Conference of Group Chairpersons or the
House resolves on the request. Following the reporting commit-
tee's examination of a bill, dissenting groups can appoint minority
rapporteurs to represent them. In connection with voting on
amendments, a Parliamentary Group may table amendments pro-
portionally to the size of the group and a number of the clauses in
the bill, which must be put to a vote even if the Speaker orders a
summary vote based on selected amendments or by principles.
Furthermore, the chairperson of a Parliamentary Group has a
number of procedural powers, provided that the group comprises
of at least (a) one-tenth of the total number of Deputies: in this
case he/she may seek the referral of a bill to the floor of the House
assigned to a Committee acting in an enacting capacity, or request
amendments from the Committee in the course of a parliamentary
session to be delayed by a maximum of three hours; (b) thirty
Deputies: he/she may request a secret ballot, submit sub-
amendments to the amendments tabled by the Committee in the
course of the session, or submit proposals to debated topics which
are not on the order of the day or agenda; or (c) twenty Deputies:
he/she may request voting by roll-call, an adjournment of the de-
bate, submit amendments and sub-amendments to motions within
deadlines that are shorter than those normally prescribed, or re-
quest a debate to be broadened to discuss the general thrust of a
particular bill.
Independent of the size of the group, the Parliamentary Group
Chairperson may also: (a) invite the Speaker of the House to re-
quest information, clarification and documents from the Court of
Auditors; (b) table a preliminary question regarding the substance
of a decree law or of a Bill enacting a decree law; (c) take up an
amendment withdrawn by its sponsor; (d) table motions or request
the discussion of motions withdrawn by their movers; (e) propose a
different referral for a particular bill; (f) request a debate on a bill
by titles or parts; (g) submit proposals for a different transposition
of the principles and guiding criteria for re-wording draft amend-
ments to the Rules adopted by the House; (h) request that the
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House to meet in closed session; and (i) object to the referral of a
bill to a Committee during a period of adjournment.
With reference to participation of groups in the bodies of the
Chamber, the groups must be represented at the Bureau and
(mostly in proportion to their numbers) on Committees. The
group chairperson is also vested with other prerogatives relating
to parliamentary oversight, and may submit no more than two
interpellations as a matter of urgency for each month of parlia-
mentary business. Each group also has the right to submit a par-
liamentary question for each session during which specific time for
questions is scheduled. Lastly, the groups are entitled to use facil-
ities, equipment and contributions from the Chamber of Deputies'
budget, bearing in mind the general basic requirements and the
size of each group.
For individual members, affiliation to a group is a necessary
condition of their status, for two reasons: (1) primarily in order to
ensure a more economical and rational organization of parliamen-
tary business; and (2) the Rules of Procedure establish a very close
linkage to the parties which, as provided by the Constitution, are
designed to prevent the fragmentation of the parliamentary man-
date, which is typical of the liberal nineteenth century systems.
The Parliamentary Groups have their own internal rules of pro-
cedure (through their Statutes or Rules). As far as "whipping"-
the requirement that parliamentarians toe the Group line-or
group discipline is concerned, it should be borne in mind that in-
dividual members are not legally obligated to vote according to the
indications of their Group. The provisions of article 67 of the Con-
stitution state that an "imperative mandate"4 is prohibited. The
Constitutional Court, in judgement 14 of March 7, 1964, stated
that each parliamentarian "is free to vote according to the indica-
tions of his or her party (or Parliamentary Group to which he or
she belongs) but they are also free not to; no provision could law-
fully require anyone to be subject to any sanctions for voting
against the directives of the party." The Council of State, the su-
preme administrative court, also ruled in judgement 642 of June
13, 1969 that party discipline is an element extraneous to the
normal exercise of parliamentary activities and that parliamentar-
ians could refuse to comply with group discipline either by facing
48. "Each Member of Parliament represents the Nation and carries out his/her duties
without a binding mandate."
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internal sanctions, or resigning from the group while retaining
their parliamentary mandate.
With regard to all of these obligations, the Rules of Procedure of
both the Chamber and the Senate act as guarantees, protecting
the rights of dissenting members and the activities of individual
parliamentarians. Indeed, in 1988 the Rules of Procedure of the
Senate laid down specific directives for the statutes of the Groups
to protect individual senators. This was a momentous turning
point. Only a short time before then, there had been a rigid sepa-
ration between the internal sources of law governing the groups
and parliamentary rules.
According to article 53(7)" of the Senate Rules of Procedure fol-
lowing the 1988 reform, the internal rules of individual Parlia-
mentary Groups are required to provide for procedures and forms
of participation that enable individual senators to express their
opinions and submit proposals on items on the parliamentary
agenda. With this provision, the Senate Rules of Procedure refer
to the Statutes of the Groups as a source of law with including
guiding principles to protect the freedom of action of each individ-
ual member.
Meanwhile, with the introduction of article 15-bis, the Rules of
Procedure of the Chamber of Deputies have also dealt with the
question of the internal democracy of the parliamentary groups,
particularly within the Mixed Group. This rule, which develops
the contents of the final sentence of article 15(2), is more appro-
priately positioned in the new article 15-bis. It requires that the
steering bodies of the Mixed Group be set up in such a way that
reflects the size of the various political groupings. It specifies that
the members of the steering bodies of the Group represent their
respective groupings in relations with the other organs of the
Chamber of Deputies. They therefore exercise all powers and
rights conferred on their grouping and act on its behalf and in its
name in all internal official bodies.
Notwithstanding their independence with regard to the adop-
tion of the statutes of the Group, the steering bodies of the Mixed
Group of the Chamber of Deputies must resolve any measure in
which the interests of the various groupings are involved. The
steering bodies must ensure the balance between the groupings
49. "7. The Rules of Procedure of individual parliamentary groups shall lay down the
procedures and manner whereby individual Senators may express their positions and sub-
mit proposals regarding the matters included in the programme of business or the agenda."
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proportionally to their numbers. Whenever any of the groupings
believes that any of its fundamental political rights have been vio-
lated in this respect, it may appeal the decision to the Speaker of
the Chamber of Deputies. The Speaker shall make a decision
personally, or place the matter before the Bureau. To date, this
provision has not been applied."o
Apart from this exceptional power conferred on the Speaker of
the Chamber of Deputies by Rule 15-bis(2), the Rules of Procedure
of the Chamber of Deputies make no other provision authorizing
the Speaker or the Bureau to adopt measures on their own author-
ity, or to rule on or modify resolutions adopted by the Parliamen-
tary Groups. The exclusion of this power is a means for protecting
the autonomy of the parliamentary groups' freedom in performing
their political/parliamentary role.
In contrast, Rule 12(2) is quite different. This Rule vests the
Bureau with the task of ruling on appeals concerning the estab-
lishment or first meeting of groups. The rationale of this provision
is obviously to regulate the moment in which the parliamentary
groups are formed. For in this phase they have not yet acquired
their full and autonomous subjectivity within the Chamber of
Deputies system. They do not have their own rules adopted by
their own members, or organs with the powers to apply these
rules, accountable for their conduct towards the members of the
group. For this reason, the Rules of Procedure empower the Bu-
reau to decide on appeals concerning the establishment of groups,
precisely to guarantee the lawfulness of the procedures required to
give the group legal existence. Once this is complete, the group
has the power to take its own decisions, with the sphere of compe-
tence reserved to its own organs, and hence not subject to over-
sight by any outside bodies. In any event, provisions protecting
the right of individual parliamentarians to dissent from their
Group already define the status of individual parliamentarians
under the parliamentary rules.
The process of "verticalizing" the parliamentary debate, at the
level of Parliamentary Groups and then of opposing coalitions
within Parliament, can be problematic. A balance must be sought
between offering adequate guarantees for individual parliamen-
50. See M. LUCIANI, Presentation at the Seminar on the revision of the Constitution
at LUISS on 20 March 1998 on La riforma del regolamento della Camera dei deputati, in I
costituzionalisti e le riforme. Una discussione sul progetto della Commissione bicamerale per
le riforme costituzionali, 247 (S.P. Panunzio ed. 1998).
196 Vol. 52
Parliamentary Groups
tarians to take political initiatives, particularly when they dissent,
and avoiding placing restrictions on individual parliamentarians
that cannot be mechanically linked to the bipolar rationale under-
lying the new rules for the operation of the parliamentary institu-
tion. Concern has emerged that the new Rules of Procedure,
which are strongly influenced by the bipolar dialectic between the
political forces, could lead to excessive restrictions being placed on
the rights of parliamentarians who do not accept that rationale.
Parliamentarians stand the risk of being excessively penalized by
a misunderstood interpretation of the "first past the post" demo-
cratic system. Adapting the Rules of Procedure to the principle of
bipolarism has therefore not limited the freedom of the parliamen-
tarian or diminished the role of the Parliamentary Groups and
individual members.
The emphasis on bipolarism has led to procedural timing being
redistributed between the various phases of the legislative pro-
cess, in order to encourage debate between the majority and the
opposition, without excluding any dissenting deputies or groups
from the debate. The attempted goal is to reconcile the legitimate
need to streamline parliamentary work while, at the same time,
encouraging the ability of individual parliamentarians to have
their say.
Specific deadlines were set for a more rigorous scheduling of
work: a minimum period was set to thoroughly scrutinize bills in
Committee; the status of opposition groups was defined, vesting
them with significant rights both to include their own items on the
agenda, and to have alternative text put to a vote in the House
with priority over other amendments. Opposition groups were
also empowered to promote the fact-finding and scrutiny proce-
dures of the Government. Groups are required to respond to re-
quests for information and data, even if the requests are made by
minorities, promoting interaction between the Government and
the Parliament and between the majority and the opposition. Or-
gans and procedures have been instituted to improve the quality
of legislation and to simplify the legislative process. Further, the
"Prime Minister's Question Time" has been introduced; ministers
are summoned to give evidence before Committees twice a month
following the same procedure used for the House. Even though
the new Rules intended to give the majority and opposition groups
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an "enhanced" role, they also grant adequate room for the individ-
ual positions of individual deputies."
If parliamentarians cannot be subjected to "positive" constraints
by virtue of the freedom, they have to exercise their mandate; the
gradual rewriting of parliamentary rules has nevertheless laid
down a series of "negative" constraints on parliamentarians. The
new Rules have enhanced the role of the groups and their repre-
sentatives, to the detriment of individual parliamentarians.5 2 For
example, as far as scheduling parliamentary business is con-
cerned, the proposed initiatives of individual deputies outside the
mediation of the Parliamentary Groups are not guaranteed any
follow-up. Or once again, only groups, acting through their chair-
person, may submit urgent interpellations or questions for imme-
51. The reform of the Rules, without changing the rights and prerogatives conferred
individually on each parliamentarian by the Constitution and the Parliamentary Rules of
Procedure (such as the possibility of tabling bills, amendments, motions, resolutions, inter-
pellations and parliamentary questions, and taking part in the work of the Committees and
the House), also shows particular attention to the right of individual parliamentarians to
dissent. For example Rule 24(7) provides that one-fifth of the time devoted overall for the
discussion of the items set down on the timetable of the House should be set aside for Dep-
uties who wish to speak in a personal capacity. Furthermore, specific guarantees are set
down for the general discussion and for the discussion of individual clauses, and amend-
ments or additional clauses, and the Speaker may give the floor to deputies wishing to
express a dissenting vote from the group to which they belong, setting out the procedures
and the times for so doing (article 83 (1) and article 85 (7)). Individual deputies also have a
similar right to express their dissent when voting on a motion of confidence (article 16 (3)),
and when voting on a proposal to update the government's economic/financial planning
document, if required by contingent events (article 118-bis). Furthermore, individual depu-
ties are also given further guarantees to protect their positions when voting on amend-
ments submitted by groups, when implementing the regulations regarding summary votes
on selected amendments or by principles (article 85 (8)). In this connection, article 85-bis
(3) provides that the Speaker may also put separate clauses and amendments to the vote,
where they are considered relevant, that have been submitted by deputies dissenting from
the groups to which they belong. However, under the reform, the need to provide guaran-
tees for individual parliamentarians is not limited to the internal organizational phase in
the work of the Chamber of Deputies, but is also projected outwards, seeking to encourage
the MP to become more firmly established in his or her constituency. For the obligation has
been reaffirmed -which existed under the repealed article 25-bis of the Chamber of Depu-
ties Rules of Procedure, which was rarely complied with-that the work of the Chamber of
Deputies should be adjourned for one week so that parliamentarians can also perform other
activities relating to their constituents.
52. Regarding the principle of the so called "imperative mandate," see P. RIDOIA,
Diritti di liberta 119-20 (stating that this principle "acts not only as a protection of the
individual status of MPs ... but it carries a further connotation, within democratic systems
and with respect to relations among actors of pluralism, in that it guarantees the mobility
of the political system. It enables MPs to keep up communication channels with public
opinion, limiting the risk of a political system overly constrained by party discipline and, on
the other hand, it offers political parties - via the independence of their MPs - the possibil-
ity to participate in a system of mediation vis-A-vis societal complexity.")
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diate answer, whether on the Floor or in Committee. 53 In princi-
ple, individual parliamentarians are entitled to express their opin-
ion when they dissent from their group, but nevertheless this
guarantee can also depend on the discretion of the Speaker, who
has the responsibility of deciding "the modalities and the time lim-
its on any statement," or evaluating "the relevance" of the
amendments submitted by individual deputies.54
VII. THE PHENOMENON OF PARLIAMENTARY "MOBILITY"
A further indication of the freedom that individual members
nevertheless enjoy, bearing witness to the present settling-down
phase through which Italy's political and institutional system is
passing, can be seen from the way in which parliamentarians
change groups.5' The electoral system in force between 1993 and
2005, based on the "first past the post" system and not fully com-
pleted at the institutional level, by no means simplified the politi-
cal system - one only has to look at the number of Parliamentary
Groups. Neither has it curbed the fragmentation between and
within political forces, because of the prevalence of the positions of
individual parliamentarians and the weakening of group disci-
pline.
The large number of transfers from one group to another that
was typical of the Thirteenth Parliament could represent the per-
manent feature of nervousness in the political system. Member
mobility might have serious repercussions both on Parliament and
on the fate of governments, by disrupting the existing political
balances. However, one should avoid facile simplifications in an
attempt to explain the reasons for this, by simply attributing
53. It should also be noted that individual deputies may not activate these new instru-
ments for oversight and scrutiny as such, because these instruments are always tabled
through the Parliamentary Group to which they belong. For as far as parliamentary ques-
tions to be answered orally and immediately are concerned, whether in the House or in
Committee, a deputy for each Group can submit questions, but it has to be done through
their own Group Chairperson, which means that individual parliamentarians cannot scru-
tinize the work of the Government without the "blessing" of the Group to which they be-
long. The same applies to an even greater extent to urgent interpellations, which can only
be tabled through the Parliamentary Group Chairpersons or by at least thirty deputies for
each question, and then there are limits on the numbers that may be presented (two per
month for each group, and one for each deputy).
54. See Rules 83 (1), 85 (7), 116 (3), 118-bis (4).
55. See C. DE CARO BONELLA, I gruppi parlamentari nella XII legislatura, in Rassegna
parlamentare, 2, 360 (1996).
56. S. CURRERI, I gruppi parlamentari nella XIII legislatura, in Rassegna parlamen-
tare, 2, 264 (1999).
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transformism or political convenience. The collapse of political
ideologies and the crisis of the traditional party system, hastened
by the changes in the electoral system, could fail to have immedi-
ate effects on the conduct of the political classes and on the way of
viewing political activism within the party.
It is no coincidence that, in previous parliaments, there were
not many cases of parliamentarians changing groups. A gradual
increase in migration was present, however, which often resulted
in collective movements of dissident factions within one party to
another. Across the years it was exceptional for an individual to
change groups, considering the powerful group and party disci-
pline, and the profound sense of ideological militancy. In any
event, migration was confined to limited political areas.
Instances of migration occurred in the Tenth Parliament (1987-
1992) when eighty-six MPs changed groups: sixty-six in the
Chamber of Deputies and twenty in the Senate. In the short-lived
Eleventh Parliament (1992-1994), forty-three MPs changed groups
(forty-one in the Chamber of Deputies and two in the Senate). In
the Twelfth Parliament (1994-1996), despite early dissolution, 165
MPs (117 in the Chamber of Deputies and forty-eight in the Sen-
ate) changed groups.
Group-changing in the Thirteenth Parliament (1996-2001) was
much higher than in the recent past. In the Chamber of Deputies,
139 MPs changed groups (twenty-three per cent of the total mem-
bership of the Chamber), while eighty-two senators (one quarter of
the membership of the Senate) did so. This phenomenon also
reached extreme peaks when some MPs changed groups several
times: fifty-nine deputies changed groups only once; thirty-seven
deputies changed twice; thirty-two deputies three times; seven
deputies four times; one deputy five times; two deputies six times;
and one deputy as many as eight times. This phenomenon did not
reoccur on the same scale in the Fourteenth Parliament (2001-
2006), when only thirty-nine members of the House and twenty-
one Senators changed groups.
However, confirming the powerful influence of the electoral sys-
tem on this phenomenon, it was the Deputies elected in "first past
the post" constituencies that changed group most frequently. This
indicates a weaker attachment to party membership by those
elected under the "first past the post" system (ninety-eight depu-
ties in the Thirteenth Parliament), in comparison with those
elected in the proportional representation constituencies (forty-one
deputies in the Thirteenth Parliament). Even the latter propor-
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tional representation constituencies were strongly affected by this
phenomenon: contrary to what one might believe, considering the
direct and privileged relationship that MPs elected in "first past
the post" constituencies might claim to have with their electorate,
parliamentary mobility also affected MPs elected with the propor-
tional representation system (which was quite sizable considering
the different proportion of parliamentarians elected with each of
these two systems). Despite the greater "gratitude" that the latter
ought to have towards the political movements that put their
names on the lists, proportional representation constituencies still
experienced group migration.
The most typical cases of group changes can be brought under
three headings: (a) the transfer of MPs from one group to another
while remaining in the same electoral coalition; (b) group changes
across coalitions, despite a less than fully bipolar system; and (c)
collective migrations resulting from splits and re-groupings affect-
ing a number of political parties. Against this background, the
Mixed Group served as a stop-over group, a refuge for parliamen-
tarians who did not move directly due to concerns about their im-
age, in moving one political force to another. But these temporary
shuffles in and out of the Mixed Group gave rise to the problem of
identifying and managing the political groupings within the Mixed
Group.
Problems with the Mixed Group demonstrate that parliamen-
tary mobility must be considered worthy of close attention because
of the political and institutional implications that it has. There is
no doubt that the electoral system that existed until 2005 contrib-
uted considerably to focusing on the "member" element, to the det-
riment of the "party" element. This is particularly true considering
parliamentarians' view on party discipline, and hence group disci-
pline, as increasingly less binding and imperative. The gradual
loss of ideological ties and the constant rapprochement between
the stances adopted by the political forces also participated in the
development of member mobility.
Yet the very organization of political forces in Parliament actu-
ally contributes to fostering mobility. For while the electoral con-
test is based on coalitions of parties, the political forces, immedi-
ately after an election, once again split in Parliament to set up
their own parliamentary groups. This makes it possible for MPs to
have a certain freedom of movement within their coalition, weak-
57. COZZOLI, supra note 6, at 100.
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ening the linkage between parliamentarians and the political forc-
es to which they originally belonged.
Furthermore, the tendency of parliamentarians to demand
greater political autonomy as a result of the obligations arising
from their own constituency is also being driven by current legis-
lation. For example, the legislation on the refunding of election
expenses, or the subsidies available for publishing, which allow
even the tiniest political formations to qualify for these grants,
encourage the splits within Parliamentary Groups. A risk arises
from the absence of appropriate forms of coordination and disci-
pline. Often, parliamentarians' right to act independently of the
mandate given to them by the electorate and the political parties
is used to pursue an excessively individualistic and laissez-faire
concept of parliamentary representation.
The freedom of parliamentarians, a fundamental safeguard up-
held by the Constitutional Court to defend every MP from pres-
sures exerted by their own political group, cannot and should not
be used as a tool to jeopardize the functionality and democratic
nature of the system. At the present time, the only way that Dep-
uties and Senators can be penalized under the Parliamentary
Rules for switching groups is found in the provisions governing
the composition of the Bureaus of the Chamber of Deputies and
the Senate. The provisions state that parliamentarians who have
been appointed Secretaries lose office as soon as they join another
Parliamentary Group." Any further penalty likely to affect the
status of the parliamentarians, however, should be considered in-
fringement of article 67 of the Constitution.o
Any interpretation that would place such a privileged emphasis
on the exercise of freedom by parliamentarians would destructive-
ly lead to individualistic parliamentary representation, detached
from any rationale of party membership. There is no basis for lais-
sez-faire style representation in other provisions of the Constitu-
58. See CURRERI, supra note 56, at 277.
59. In the Chamber of Deputies (Rule 5(7)) the Secretary loses their "office if the Group
they belonged to at the time of their election ceases to exist, or if they join another Group
that is already represented in the Bureau;" in the Senate (Rule 5(9-bis)) a penalty is im-
posed for any group change. But in both Houses, it is only the additional Secretaries who
lose office, that is to say, the ones that have been elected to guarantee representation of the
smallest groups, but not for those who are elected initially as a result of the agreements
concluded between the originally constituted groups.
60. Article 67 states that each Member of Parliament represents the Nation and carries
out his/her duties without a binding mandate. A penalty towards a parliamentarian could
limit his freedom guaranteed by the Constitution during the mandate.
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tion, which provide that political parties are the instruments
through which the people exercise popular sovereignty (art. 1
Const.) and use the democratic method to establish national policy
(art. 49 Const). The parliamentary groups - mentioned in articles
72 and 82 of the Constitution by reference, respectively, to the
composition of the Standing Committees and the Investigation
Committees - are the natural parliamentary projection of the po-
litical parties.
As indicated above, the phenomenon of parliamentary "mobility"
did not occur in the Fourteenth Parliament because crossing over
from one group to another has been fairly limited. In the Fif-
teenth Parliament, which only lasted two years due to the fall of
the Prodi Government, group-changing was a limited phenome-
non: in the Chamber, sixty-five Deputies changed their group in
contrast to fifty-five Senators. Similarly, in the Sixteenth Parlia-
ment, only twenty-four Deputies and sixteen Senators have
switched groups. The Mixed Group has been a stop-over for par-
liamentarians that have not changed groups directly, but have
moved from one political force to another, by way of the Mixed
Group. All this shows that parliamentary mobility must be con-
sidered as deserving of attention, because of the political and in-
stitutional implications it entails.
VIII. COMPARATIVE REMARKS: THE U.S. HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES AND SENATE
In the light of what precedes, a comparison may be drawn with
the system in place at the United States Congress. Such a compar-
ison, however, must move from the premise that the basic political
circumstances are different. Apart from the obvious difference in
area and in population (the United States has more than 300 mil-
lion inhabitants, whereas Italy has about one-fifth as much in the
last census), in the U.S. House and Senate, the two-party system
is solid and has been so for two centuries. Nonetheless, the Italian
Houses are larger; the House counts 630 members and the Senate
315 (whereas the U.S. House has 435 members, with 100 sena-
tors). In the United States, the system springs from the "first past
the post" electoral mechanism of British origin, and none of the
politicians wish to change it. Members who are not elected as
members of the Republican or of the Democratic Party (the Inde-
pendents) are very few.
Italy has used three electoral methods in sixty-five years: (1)
from 1948 to 1992, a strictly proportional system; (2) from 1994 to
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2001, a mixed system, in which "first past the post" districts gave
three-quarters of the seats in both Houses, while the other quarter
was elected in a proportional manner; and (3) from 2006 to pre-
sent, a new system based on proportional representation, but with
an added premium for the party or coalition of parties that wins
the most votes. Therefore, the first evident difference between the
two nations' systems is that party discipline is stronger in Italy,
when compared to the U.S. Senate at least.
Fractions - more commonly known as called "conferences" or
"caucuses" in the United States - have a different, stronger posi-
tion in regard to the members, due to the fact that members are
elected directly in their constituencies. In this respect, another
couple of considerations must be added.
First, in the United States, the term in the House is two years.
In Italy, both Houses last for a five-year term. As a result, in Italy
campaigning is not as frequent and close. Second, based on the
constant campaigning, the issue of fundraising in the United
States is always of the essence. It is widely known, as reflected in
the 1976 United States Supreme Court decision, Buckley v.
Valeo," that members of the United States House and Senate
spend a lot of their time in fundraising activities.6 2 A successful
fundraiser is likely to be rather independent from his leader in
either House.
In Italy, statutes bar television political ads and the publication
of opinion polls within thirty days of Election Day. The need for
campaign money is thus slightly less felt. Furthermore, once the
electoral system shifted back to proportional representation in
2006, members of Parliament (and therefore members of Parlia-
mentary Fractions) are mainly a self-appointed 61ige that does not
campaign in any specific district.
In the United States, the legislative branch works on a majori-
tarian base, particularly in the House of Representatives: the
Speaker of the House is by all means the leader of the ruling par-
ty, while the majority leader is the secondary leader. The Vice-
61. 424 U.S. 1, 21 (1976).
62. After the famous (or infamous, according to a different view) Buckley decision, the
Court had accepted some legislative limits on campaign spending in the 2003 decision
McConnell v. FEC, but then in 2010, in Citizens United v. FEC, it struck down almost all
money caps. McConnell v. Fed. Election Commn., 540 U.S. 93, 223-34 (2003); Citizens
United v. Fed. Election Commn., 558 U.S. 310, 372 (2010). The literature on the subject
matter is vast. See, e.g., E. J. ROSENKRANZ, If Buckley Fell (Century Foundation Press
1999); and for a stark criticism of the system in place, see C. LEWIS, The Buying of the
Congress (Avon Books 1998).
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President of the United States presides over the Senate." Only if
the President is a lame duck does the Senate have a Senator of the
opposite party as a majority leader. The opposition party elects
within its caucus a minority leader in the House and Senate.
Thus, there are no fractions in the European sense in the Unit-
ed States. The two parties hold caucuses (the Democrats) and con-
ferences (the Republicans) to decide their strategy in legislative
procedures. The few Independents caucus either with one or with
the other party (there is no notion of "Mixed caucuses"). For in-
stance, presently, Independent Senators Joe Lieberman of Con-
necticut and Bernie Sanders of Vermont caucus with the Demo-
crats.
At the committee level, the majority caucus gets to elect all of
the chairmen, and the minority designates its ranking member.
Staff usually is accountable either to the chair of the committee or
to the ranking member, according to party affiliation.
The Rules Committee in the House is in charge of setting the
agenda and shaping the debate, allowing time and amendments to
each bill to be discussed. The Rules Committee is chaired by a
person with the trust of the Speaker and is composed of nine
members of the ruling party and only four of the minority party.
This means that the majority has a direct grip on the congression-
al agenda and usually allows the so-called 'closed rule' and not a
full and open debate on the floor of the House on any given bill.'
On the contrary, in Italy the majority's control over the agenda
is only indirect. The ruling party must give up some space to the
opposition groups (something similar happens in the British Par-
liament with opposition days and Private members' bill days). As
stated above, the Speaker of the House is the leader of the ruling
party of the House. The Speaker is in charge of promoting his
party to achieve the maximum advantage point. In the Italian
Houses, the Chief presiding officer - the Speaker of the House and
the President of the Senate - should instead ensure fairness of
proceedings and fidelity to the Constitution and precedents.
On the other hand, individual senators in the United States are
much more relevant and powerful than in Italy. A United States
senator represents his State and will not bow down easily to the
whip, or even to the leader of his own conference or caucus, if he
does not deem the party's agenda fit for the interests of his State.
63. MCKAY & JOHNSON, supra note 1, at 188.
64. See M. Doran, The closed Rule, 59 EMORY L. J., 1387 (2010).
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This is particularly obvious in two cases, confirmation procedures
and filibuster.
When the President appoints a federal official and then sends
for confirmation in the Senate, according to the "Advice and Con-
sent" rule laid down in Article II, Section 2, Clause 2 of the Consti-
tution, the senators from the State that prospective official is
from have great influence. An informal 'senatorial courtesy' pro-
cedure is in place, by which the two senators from that State must
be given the opportunity to express their opinion about the ap-
pointee, even before formal procedures of confirmation start at
committee level. The senators must be given time to fill in a "blue
slip," a sheet of paper on which they might write their position on
that person 6 .
It is often understood that if one or both senators from the State
do not return a favorable 'blue slip' (or do to not return it at all),
the appointment will go no further. The position that Senators
take in confirmation procedures are usually not compelled by the
conference to which they belong. If a Senator does not wish to re-
turn the blue slip or vote for the appointee, his own Senate leader
will have a hard time persuading him to do otherwise.
None of this occurs in the Italian Senate. Advice and consent
(i.e. 'confirmation') does not exist in Italy, as it is understood in
the United States. Some statutes call for parliamentary approval
of Executive branch appointments. But on these issues, Commit-
tees usually vote along party lines -that is, the individual mem-
ber does not have much of a say.
Regarding the filibuster, it is well known that at least forty-one
Senators can virtually paralyze the United States Senate, pre-
venting the whole from coming to a vote on any given matter. To
break the filibuster in the Senate, sixty Senators are needed. The
decision to filibuster is usually a matter settled by the leadership
of the party in the minority. However, decisions in this field are
delicate, and individual senators can decide differently and go
against their own leadership.
All this does not happen in the Italian Senate. No filibuster is
permitted in Italy. The Senate in Italy is much more similar, in
its political workings, to the United States House.
65. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
66. See R.C. Black, A.J. Madonna, R.J. Owens, Obstructing Agenda-Setting: Examining
Blue Slip Behavior in the Senate, The Forum, Governing Through the Senate, Vol. 9, No. 4,
Art. 9, 4 (2011).
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IX. CONCLUSIONS
The trends in the new ways that parliamentary work is orga-
nized are very promising for the changes that are coming to the
Italian institutional system. To initially assess the way the re-
forms of the Thirteenth Parliament's Rules of Procedure of the
Chamber of Deputies are working, one has to ask whether the in-
novations that have been introduced are a major signal of the Ital-
ian system joining the stable majoritarian democracies, 7 or
whether it is still a marker that the system is still in a transition-
al phase.
There is no single answer to this question. All of the amend-
ments that have been introduced attempt to give both Houses of
Parliament efficient decision-making rules that expedite political
processes and adjust them to the pace of processes of civil society.
However, there are nevertheless a number of contradictions in the
modification of parliamentary rules" because, on the one hand,
they try to anticipate the institutional innovations being debated
in Parliament, while at the same time, they reflect the painfully
slow process of restructuring the party system.
The reforms of the Rules following the new electoral system in-
troduced in 1993 anticipated the constitutional reforms that have
taken place at three different levels:70 the first level, the interac-
tion between government, majority and opposition; the second lev-
el, in which the parliamentary groups are the main players, as
well as the political forces that do not have enough members to
form a Group, and which set themselves up as political groupings
within the Mixed Group; and the third level, the individual depu-
ties who are given adequate scope for political initiative within the
group or majority or opposition coalition to which they belong.
Thus, the Italian political-parliamentary system has in a slow and
convoluted way oriented itself towards new rules which have
made it very different from the past, even though it has not
67. G. ROLLA, Riforma dei regolamenti parlamentari ed evoluzione della forma di Gov-
erno in Italia, in Rivista trimestrale di diritto pubblico, 603, n. 3 (2000).
68. F. LANCHESTER, Presentation at the Seminar on the revision of the Constitution at
LUISS on 20 March 1998 on "La riforma del regolamento della Camera dei deputati", in
PANUNZIO S.P., I costituzionalisti e le riforme. Una discussione sul progetto della Com-
missione bicamerale per le riforme costituzionali, Milano, 1998, 244.
69. COZZOLI, supra note 6, at 129.
70. V. Cozzoli, L'evoluzione del ruolo dei gruppi parlamentari nel Regolamento della
Camera dei deputati, (The development of the role of the Parliamentary Groups in the
Rules of the Chamber of Deputies) in Studi polacco-italiani dell'Universita di Torun
(Polonia), IV, 157 (2005).
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achieved a full coherence due to the ostensible and incomplete bi-
polarization of the political-parliamentary system produced by the
electoral system. To compound the picture, this system has
changed again following Law no. 270 of 2005,n while the political
system remains fragmented.
Ten years since their adoption, the reforms of the Rules of Pro-
cedure of the Chamber of Deputies, which are a major piece of the
mosaic in the process of reforming representative institutions and
the Italian form of government, emphasize the linkage between
the government and its parliamentary majority within the frame-
work of a system that guarantees enhanced rights for political mi-
norities. Relatedly, the decrease in the number of parliamentary
groups following the new electoral legislation in 2005 is a crucial
factor for the streamlining of the political system and a more effi-
cient Parliament.7 2 From this point of view, parliamentary groups
tend to supersede the established model of parliamentary practice
of an opposition working through the method of disorganized and
fragmented obstructionism, while placing emphasis on the role of
the opposition as a rival force, standing as an alternative to the
political majority in government."
71. See Legge Dicembre 2005, supra note 23.
72. Regarding the effects of the recent electoral law in terms of political fragmentation
see L. GIANNITI, in Gruppi e componenti politiche tra un sistema elettorale e l'altro, rela-
zione al seminario di studio "le regole del diritto parlamentare nella dialettica tra maggio-
ranza e opposizione" Roma 17 marzo 2006, now in E. Gianfrancesco, Le regole del diritto
parlamentare nella dialettica tra maggioranza e opposizione 31 (N. Lupo ed. 2007).
73. See V. Di PORTo & E. Rossi, Ostruzionismo, in Digesto-Discipline pubblicistiche, X
546-47, 572 (2005).
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